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Trade, Constitutionausm, and Human Rights: An Overview 
by Frank J. Garcia* 
Frederick Abbot asks a question: "If the WTO is a trade constitution, what should its 
bill of rights look like?" My remarks address a preliminary question: Why should the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) have a bill of rights? 
The "constitutionalism critique" claims that the WTO lacks legitimacy because its 
exercise of state power at the international level is not the direct result of a participa 
tory interest-balancing political process and is not adequately subjected to fundamental 
rights-based restraints and guarantees. The matter is further complicated by our current 
"functional specialization" model of international governance. In domestic governance 
a single integrated legislative/executive/judicial system resolves matters of economic 
policy, human rights, and their interrelationships. For international governance, states 
create separate legal-institutional regimes specialized according to function and lacking 
a central coordinated approach to the problems of multiple overlappingjurisdiction? 
such as the many current "trade and_" problems. Constitutionalism is one way of 
demanding more comprehensive consideration of such issues than the current func 
tional specialization approach permits. Constitutional modifications could incorporate 
human rights more fully into the WTO system, both in terms of substantive policy 
making and as a constraint on the WTO-based exercise of state power. Hence, the ques 
tion of a WTO bill of rights. 
Turning now to the question of human rights and the WTO, it is useful to distinguish 
between internal and external challenges. Internal human rights issues are raised by 
the WTO system itself: trade law as the problem. One can ask, for example, whether the 
operation of particular trade rules infringes upon or threatens human rights, such as 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and 
the right to health or Generalized System of Preferences implementation and the right 
to development. Here, human rights discourse has been adopted as the vehicle through 
which to express disagreement with the balance struck in particular cases between pro 
ducer interests and consumer/public interests. 
External human rights challenges highlight the role trade law could have in addres 
sing human rights problems that arise outside of trade law itself. There are several 
sources of external challenge, among them unilateral state human rights activism, 
multilateral treaty-based human rights activism, and the prospect of human rights-based 
trade conditionality. 
When states employ trade sanctions unilaterally to protect human rights in other 
jurisdictions, a WTO issue is raised. An example would be the U.S. ban on imports manu 
factured through indentured child labor. Under the WTO doctrinal structure, such a 
measure would not easily survive legal challenge: There is no explicit human rights excep 
tion in Article XX of GATT, and applying existing exceptions in such cases raises 
interpretive difficulties. Moreover, the approach taken by WTO doctrine to such a chal 
lenge (balancing trade liberalization against human rights protection) could be consid 
ered inappropriate where human rights are concerned. Thus, the WTO could be an 
obstacle to human rights protection. 
A second, related problem is posed by multilateral human rights activism if trade sanc 
tions against a member for human rights violations were to be organized by a regional or 
multilateral human rights or collective security mechanism such as the Organization of 
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American States, the United Nations, or the Council of Europe. This would also be 
vulnerable to a WTO legal challenge because there is no general mechanism in WTO 
law to defer to, recognize, or incorporate collective human rights sanctions. The only 
exception, found in GATT XXI(c), is limited to actions taken pursuant to UN obli 
gations to maintain international peace and security.1 
The third way external human rights issues come into trade law involves conditional 
ity: to what extent should human rights compliance be a precondition to WTO trade 
benefits? Conditionality is an attractive mechanism for human rights advocates, and the 
European Union, Mercosur, and other trade regimes already require adherence to 
basic human rights as a condition for membership. However, the WTO does not?and 
therein lies either an embarrassment or an opportunity depending on your viewpoint. 
The simplest WTO response to all these challenges is to do nothing. Inaction would 
imply ratification by the international community of the following propositions: 
? Current WTO agreements reflect the appropriate balance between economic 
values and human rights values. 
? 
Any trade sanction short of a UN sanction will be rejected if challenged in WTO. 
? There need be no baseline human rights commitments for WTO membership. 
Such implicit ratification could cause a WTO legitimacy crisis, at least for liberal states. 
Another possible WTO response could be to address internal challenges only, either 
in a limited or a broad way. A limited approach would be to modify specific agreements 
(e.g., TRIPS) to address human rights concerns on an ad hoc political basis. A broader 
approach would be to draft a statement of human rights principles that all WTO agree 
ments must comply with. This starts to look like a WTO bill of rights. If this approach 
is taken, should states be permitted to challenge nationally implemented WTO rules 
on grounds that how they are implemented violates WTO human rights rules, thus 
creating a new, independent ground for WTO complaints? Should states be permitted 
to challenge provisions in the WTO Dispute Setdement Body as violating WTO human 
rights rules, like using a court-based constitutionality review? Not easy questions. 
Even this type of response, complicated as it is, does not address any of the external 
human rights challenges facing the WTO. These challenges pose perhaps the most dif 
ficult question of all: Is the WTO to serve as a vehicle to facilitate, or even organize, human 
rights trade sanctions? If not, the status quo is unchanged. If so, then WTO doctrine 
must be reformed to create room for human rights sanctions, whether unilateral or 
multilateral. This would require an amendment, because judicial implementation argu 
ably exceeds the WTO Appellate Body's current competence. Options include a new 
across-the-board human rights exception like the Article XXI national security excep 
tion; a hierarchy of norms provision like North American Free Trade Agreement Article 
104,2 to defer to certain treaty-based human rights sanctions; or amending Article XX 
to add a human rights exception. The literature is rich with discussions of the many 
substantive, normative, and political issues raised by all these approaches. 
Finally, WTO members may decide human rights conditionality delivers the greatest 
benefit with the least political cost. WTO members are already subject to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and other customary human rights laws, and the majority 
are parties to the main human rights treaties. Amending the WTO Charter to condition 
membership on adherence to such instruments, or drawing a list of core human rights 
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade?Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Final Act Embodying the Re 
sults ofthe Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,1994, art XXI (c), 33 ILM 1125 (1984). 2 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 104,32 ILM 296,297 (1993). 
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from such instruments which current and aspiring WTO members would have to 
respect, establishes an important precedent. In both cases, however, the difficult ques 
tion is enforcement: should the WTO permit or require trade sanctions if members fail 
to honor their commitments? 
Any human rights modifications of the WTO regime would need to address the fol 
lowing issues: 
? Institutional culture: Can WTO institutions adequately deal with human rights 
concerns? 
? 
Participation: Would WTO human rights activism intensify calls for increased 
civil society participation? 
? Cultural Relativism: What about claims of regional differences in human rights 
cultures within the WTO membership? 
? Trade and Development: Are different regulatory standards (for labor rights, 
for example) a valid responses to development needs? 
? 
Jurisdiction: Will the WTO regulate investment and corporate conduct human 
rights issues? 
? Sanctions: How should the WTO respond to challenges to the morality and 
efficacy of sanctions? 
? 
Subsidiarity: Will states remain the primary agents of human rights protection, 
or will multilateral institutions like the WTO take over? 
Such conflicts require the sort of interest-balancing political process that constitu 
tional systems create, subject to the sort of fundamental safeguards that rights-based 
constitutions safeguard. The current architecture limiting the constitutional process to 
the member state level and funneling its outputs into functionally specialized treaty 
bodies is inadequate to legitimately, and effectively, address the many human rights 
issues raised internally and externally by trade law. Adding a bill of rights to the WTO 
deals with some problems, but not this one. 
The trade and human rights debate is thus another area of international life posing 
the difficult question?if the functional specialization model is inadequate, what will 
replace it? In this sense, the trade and human rights discussion is part of global society's 
ongoing constitutional convention. 
